The Folly of Generals

Discover 'The Folly of Generals' by David Colley, a captivating hardback analysis of military strategy in the European Theatre of Operations during World War II. This compelling book, published by Casemate, delves into the critical misjudgments made by Allied supreme commander, General Dwight Eisenhower, in the pivotal months leading up to the end of the war. Through vivid narrative and meticulous research, Colley examines how decisions made in late 1944 could have drastically altered the course of history, potentially saving countless lives. The author highlights key military operations, including the American penetration of the Siegfried Line, the advance into Wallendorf, and the critical engagements in the Stolberg Corridor. This thorough investigation sheds light on how Eisenhower’s choices, including the controversial cancellation of a major operation in November 1944, impacted the war's outcome. Colley contrasts these events with Operation Market Garden, providing insights that reveal the operational shortcomings faced by Allied forces. With 288 pages of strategic analysis, 'The Folly of Generals' is essential reading for history enthusiasts, military analysts, and those interested in World War II. Enrich your understanding of military tactics and leadership failures in this eye-opening account that reexamines historical narratives with fresh perspective.

Author: David Colley Publisher: Casemate
Bind: hardback
Dimensions: 152 x 228 mm
Pages: 288
Publication Date: 15-05-2021

Imagine how many lives would have been saved had the war in Europe finished in December 1944 instead of five months later... David Colley analyses critical mistakes made by the Allied supreme commander, General Dwight Eisenhower, in the last nine months of the war. He argues that had Eisenhower been more adept at taking advantage of several potential breakthroughs in the Siegfried Line in the fall of 1944 the war in the European Theatre of Operations might have ended sooner. The book details the American penetration of the Siegfried Line in mid-September and their advance into Germany at Wallendorf before the troops were called back. It also examines in detail operations in the Stolberg Corridor and the actions of General Lucian Truscott. It compares the battles at Wallendorf and Stolberg with Operation Market Garden, and assesses the effectiveness of these operations and the use of the troops. Eisenhower later called off another operation in November 1944, already in progress, to cross the Rhine and destroy the German 1st Army north of Strasbourg. American and German generals believe this operation would have shortened the war. The Folly of Generals explores these potential breakthroughs - along with other strategic and tactical mistakes in the ETO and in Italy, some never before revealed - that might have shortened the war by a considerable margin.